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et al.: Case Notes

CASE NOTES
?EVIDENCE Privileged Communication
Attorney
'and Client - Effect of the Privilege on Disclosure of Client's Identity. - Appellant, a California tax attorney, was
summoned before the Internal Revenue Service and directed
to identify taxpayers for whom he made payments of over
$12,000 in back income taxes, and to further identify the
attorney and accountants employing him on the taxpayers'
behalf. Appellant appeared in answer to the subpoena, but
declined to name the taxpayers on the ground that he did
not know their names, and declined to name the attorney
or accountants on the ground that such information came to
him as a privileged communicaton. Appellee then filed a
petition for enforcement of its summons. At the hearing
the district court rendered a judgment of civil contempt because of appellant's refusal to answer questions as to the
identity of the taxpayers, and attorney appealed. A cross
appeal was taken from that portion of the judgment which
refused to require appellant to answer other questions, with
respect to identity of the attorney and accountants. HELD:
Reversed in part. An attorney cannot be compelled to divulge
the names of clients who employ him to mail sums of money
to the government in payment of their back taxes, which are
at the time unsued upon, and as to which no government investigation is pending. Baird v. Koerner, 279 F. 2d 623 (9th
Cir. 1960).
It is well settled that confidential communications between
attorney and client are privileged both at common law and
under express statutes, and may not, without the consent
of the client, be divulged by the attorney. Branden v. Gowing,
7 Rich. L. 459 (1854). However, the existence of the relation of attorney and client is not a privilege communication.
Tomlinson v. United States, 93 F. 2d 652 (1937); MCCoRMICK, EVIDENCE § 94 (1954). So, ordinarily the client's
identity is not within the scope of the privilege. Martin v.
Anderson, 21 Ga. 301 (1857); 8 WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE § 2313
(3d ed. 1940). Wigmore further states that much should
depend on the circumstances of the case, 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§ 2313 (3d ed. 1940), and where the circumstances are such
that the rname is material only to show acknowledgement
-
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of guilt by the client of the very offense on account of which
the attorney was employed, the client's identification is
privileged. Ex Parte McDonough, 170 Cal. 230, 149 P. 566
(1915). Various rationales are given as the basis for this
.disclosure rule. It is said that the privilege is founded on
proof of the fact that the relationship of attorney and client
existed, Harrimanv. Jones, 58 N. H. 328 (1878), or that a
prevailing air of sharp practice pervades most attempts to
suppress proof of professional employment, McCoRmICK,
EVIDENCE, § 94 (1954) and that every litigant is entitled to
know the identity of his opponent. 8 WIGmORE, EVIDENCE
§ 2313 (3d ed. 1940). The privilege applies, however, where
giving out the client's name will serve no necessary purpose,
but, on the contrary, would make public the very fact that the
client is entitled to have kept secret, In re Kaplan, 8 N. Y. 2d
214, 168 N. E. 2d 660 (1960), or where there is no necessity
for any inquiry and the question asked assumes the attorney
did represent certain people as clients, In re Shawmut Mining
Company, 94 App. Div. 156, 87 N. Y. Supp. 1059 (1904), or
where the identification aids a hostile litigant in establishing
evidence which could be the basis of a suit against the client
Chirac v. Reinicker, 24 U. S. (11 Wheat.) 280, 6 L. Ed. 474
(1826), or where the attorney does not purport to represent
his client, In re Malcom, 129 App. Div. 226, 113 N. Y. Supp.
666 (1908). One case has gone so far as to imply that if
an attorney is apprised, or has Zeason to believe, that the
client desires his identity concealed, it becomes a privileged
communication. Gower v. Emery, 18 Me. 79 (1841). It is
recognized, however, that this rule of privilege has a tendency
.to prevent full disclosure of the truth, and ought to be construed strictly. Foster v. Hall, 12 Pick. (Mass.) 89, 22 Am.
Dec. 400 (1831). This has been applied where the attorney's
assertion of the privilege is to cover up wrongdoing, People ex
rel Vogelstein v. Warden of County Jail of New York County,
150 Misc. 714, 270 N. Y. Supp. 362 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd mem., 242
App. Div. 611, 271 N. Y. Supp. 1059 (1934), or in furtherance
of some criminal purpose. United States v. Lee, 107 F. 702
(1901). Also, the fact of attorneyship should be established
where the employment is made for the purpose of enabling
the attorney to perform acts involving the rights of third
parties who rely on the representation, Martin v. Platt, 51
Hun (N. Y.) 429, 4 N. Y. Supp. 359 (1889), or the ends of
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justice are defeated by preventing full disclosure, United
States v. Tomlinson, supra. But the public's right must give
way where an individual's name is useful in an attempt to
convict him of a federal crime. Hoffman v. United States,
341 U. S. 479, 95 L. Ed, 1118 (1951) ; Bairdv. Koerner,supra.
On its facts, the case is correct, since the decision is based
on the exception announced in Ex Parte McDonough, supra.
The government's contention that this case was overruled
by Brunner v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 2d 616, 335 P. 2d 484
(1959) was dismissed. In considering the principal case,
the absence of a Federal rule governing privilege led the
court to determine the issue under the state rules of evidence.
FED. R. CIV. P. 43(a). The court, therefore, deemed controlling the California statute that "An attorney cannot,
without the consent of his client, be examined as to any
communication made by the client to him, or his advice given
thereon in the course of professional employment." CAL. CODE
CIV. P. § 1881(2) (Deering 1959). The policy as to the attorney-client relationship was declared to be an absolute privilege, as construed by the MeDonough case, based on no exceptions being created by the statute as was done with other
privileges. Other factors in the court's opinion should be
noted. First, the relationship of attorney and client was
shown to exist from the circumstances which led the government to summon the attorney initially. Secondly, no litigation
exists; the attorney does not purport to represent his client
in a suit. In addition, there is no indication of future wrongdoing or fraud by hiding behind the privilege, as the dissent
in the McDonough case indicates is often the situation. Rather,
there is a desire to right a wrong; the voluntary nature
of the payment indicates a feeling of guilt for nonpayment
of taxes. (It is interesting to note that the Internal Revenue
Service maintains an independent account for the express
purpose of depositing anonymous payments. This account
is appropriately named the "Conscience Fund.") Even the
instant case recognizes that the policy of full disclosure is
more fundamental than the attorney-client privilege. Consequently, it is believed that a balance must be struck.
In each case, the public's right of full disclosure must be
weighed against an individual's right to freely confide in his
attorney. Of such tenets is our judicial system composed.
Neither should give way to the other except as moved by the
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facts of the case. Either, existing absolutely and to the
exclusion of the other, would fail because of its inability to
do justice in all cases. They do, moreover, complement each
other. Everyone has a right to legal advice, a fortiori he
should have the right to judicial pronouncement upon these
conflicting policies.
DAvID A. MERLINE.

FEDERAL INCOME TAX -

Interest Deduction

-

Amounts Designated "Interest" on Annuity Contract Loan.
Taxpayer purchased an annuity policy from an Indiana
insurance company on December 20, 1951, and simultaneously
made the first of forty-one contemplated annual premium payments. The following day taxpayer prepaid the remaining
premiums at a discount, after procuring the necessary funds
by a bank loan on the policy. On December 24 he paid to
the insurance company an amount which was mutually designated "prepaid interest" on an anticipated policy loan.
Three days later taxpayer received the full cash loan value
of the annuity, increased by a discount on the interest prepayment, and liquidated the bank loan with a portion of the
proceeds. On December 31, 1952 he made an additional prepayment of interest, and immediately thereafter he received
the increased cash value of the policy. The policy loans,
which were non-recourse in nature, were never repaid.
Taxpayer claimed the full amounts of the two "interest"
payments as deductions of "interest paid" on his 1951 and
1952 Federal income tax returns. Taxpayer's net cash outlay was substantially less than the claimed interest deductions. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue in 1954
disallowed both deductions entirely, on the ground that such
payments did not in fact constitute interest. Rev. Rul. 54-94,
1954-1 Cum. Bull. 53. The full Tax Court affirmed this
decision in 1958. On appeal to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit, HELD: Affirmed. The entire tra;nsaction lacked substance, in that it had no real effect
upon the taxpayer's economic status other than to create
an income tax deduction, and therefore gave rise to no allowable deduction. Weller v. Commissioner, 270 F. 2d 294 (3d
Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 81 Sup. Ct. 269, 5 L. Ed. 2d 223
(1960).
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The deduction of interest paid during 1951 and 1952 was
specifically authorized by statute: "In computing net income
there shall be allowed as deductions: ....All interest paid or
accrued within the taxable year on indebtedness ... ." Int.
Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 23 (b), 53 Stat. 1 (now INT. REv.
CODE OF 1954, §§ 163, 265). The Internal Revenue Service
has consistently taken the position that interest paid on annuity contract loans is not interest on indebtedness within
the meaning of the statute, and is not deductible. Rev. Rul.
54-94, 1954-1 Cum. BULL. 53. The statutory meaning of interest extends to what is usually called interest by those who
pay and those who receive amounts so denominated, and
the usual import of the term is the amount which one has
contracted to pay for the use of borrowed money. Deputy v.
duPont, 308 U. S.488, 84 L. Ed. 416 (1940) ; Old Colony R. R.
v. Commissioner, 115 F. 2d 856 (3d Cir. 1940) ; Commissioner
interest payments to be deductible, there must exist a true
debtor-creditor relationship and a fixed maturity date, at
which time the creditor can demand payment. Commissioner
v. Hood and Sons, 141 F. 2d 467 (1st Cir. 1944) ; Preston v.
Commissioner, 132 F. 2d 763 (2d Cir. 1942). Interest is
deductible only when paid upon an unconditional, enforceable obligation to pay a certain sum of money. Autenreith
v. Commissioner, 115 F. 2d 856 (3d Cir. 1940) ; Commissioner
v. Park, 113 F. 2d 352 (3d Cir. 1940). For purposes of Federal taxation, the interpretation of state laws concerning the
nature of the disputed payments is inapplicable. Doll v. Commissioner, 149 F. 2d 239 (8th Cir. 1945) ; Staunton Industrial
Loan Corp. v. Commissioner, 120 F. 2d 930 (4th Cir. 1941).
In a previous case upon similar facts, United States v. Bond,
258 F. 2d 577 (5th Cir. 1958), the court declined to consider
the question whether the payments in question were interest
within the meaning of the statute, holding that interest
payments on annuity policy loans were deductible on the
ground that such deductions were not specifically excluded in
the 1939 Code. (Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 24 (a)). The court
disregarded the long established principle that a statutory
provision granting exemption from laws imposing taxes
is to be strictly construed against the taxpayer. N. Y. Trust
Co. v. Commissioner, 68 F. 2d 19 (3d Cir. 1933); Insurance
and Title Guarantee Co. v. Commissioner, 36 F. 2d 842 (2d
Cir. 1929). In the present case the court likewise refused,
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in the final analysis, to hold that the disputed payments did
or did not represent interest paid on indebtedness within the
statutory intent, and chose to consider the substance and
motivation of taxpayer's transactions. It has long been
settled that a taxpayer may decrease the amount of his taxes,
or altogether avoid them, by means which are within the
law. Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U. S. 465, 79 L. Ed. 596
(1935) ; United States v. Isham, 84 U. S. (17 Wall.) 496, 21
L. Ed. 728 (1873). This principle is inapplicable, however, in
situations in which the transactions in question clearly lie
without the intent of the statute. Gilbert v. Commissioner,
248 F. 2d 399 (2d Cir. 1957) ; Gregory v. Helvering, supra.
Therefore, the court "must not give effect to any contrivance
which would defeat a tax Congress plainly intended to impose," nor permit the use of bookkeeping terms and accounting forms and devices to devitalize valid tax laws. Foster
v. United States, 303 U. S. 118, 121, 82 L. Ed. 700, 701 (1938).
To give effect to the intent of the tax laws, the government
may disregard sham transactions, and look to the actual substance of the taxpayer's activities. Higgins v. Smith, 308 U. S.
473, 84 L. Ed. 406 (1940). Consequently, where deductions
are claimed for interest payments involved in transactions
which do not affect taxpayer's financial position other than
by providing an interest deduction, the transactions lack substance and the deductions will be disallowed. Sonnabend v.
Commissioner, 267 F. 2d 319 (1st Cir. 1959) ; Goodstein v.
Commissioner, 267 F. 2d 127 (1st Cir. 1959) ; Gilbert v. Commissioner,supra.
The court in the Bond case considered neither the real
nature of the "interest" payments nor the substantial effect
of the transaction as a whole. That decision was followed in
Roderick v. United States, 59-2 USTC
9650 (W. D. Tex.
1959), but the Court of Appeals in Liston Zander Credit Co. V.
United States, 276 F. 2d 417 (5th Cir. 1960), adopted the
principle of the Weller case. Weller has been followed in
Knetsch v. United States, 272 F. 2d 200 (9th Cir. 1959), af'd
81 Sup. Ct. 132, 5 L. Ed. 2d 128 (1960) and Oliver L. Williams,
1959 P-H Tax Ct. Mem.
59, 045. The substance rule employed in these decisions undoubtedly provides a correct result, but it is not the most proper basis upon which to rest
that result. When the legislative intent would otherwise
be avoided, the court may look to the substance of the trans-
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action. Such authority is necessary to the proper administration of the tax laws; but it must be remembered that
that authority is not unlimited. The court should not look
to the substance of the transaction where the legislative intent can otherwise be effected. The court in the instant
case had no need to determine that the transactions involved
lacked economic substance, for the reason that a more simple and direct ground existed for disallowing the questioned
deductions. The "interest" payments were not "interest on
indebtedness" as that term has been construed by the courts,
and accordingly were not deductible as such. The interest
claimed was not incurred on indebtedness having a fixed
maturity date and consisting of an unconditional and enforceable obligation. The payments lack all of those essential features, prescribed by overwhelming judicial authority, which must exist in order to give rise to a deduction
for interest on indebtedness within the meaning of the Internal Revenue Code. This viewpoint was adopted in Haggard
v. United States, 59-1 USTC
9299 (D. Ariz. 1959). The
problem of adopting the proper basis for disallowance of
such deductions extends only to situations involving payments
made prior to March 1, 1954, for the reason that interest
paid since that date on annuity policy loans is now specifically non-deductible by statute. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
§ 264(a) (2).
ROBERT A. DOBSON, JR.

PROPERTY - Adverse Possession Requirement of
Ouster and Necessity of Proof as Related to Tenants in
Common. - In an action for partition of farmland, plaintiff
contended that she and defendants, her mother's brothers,
were tenants in common. Plaintiff acquired her title by deed
while defendants acquired their interest partially through a
deed and partially by way of inheritance. Defendants denied
the tenancy in common asserting title to the land by adverse
possession. They contended ouster of the plaintiff and as a
basis therefor proved that they were in possession, had paid
taxes, cut wood, rented and tilled the soil, constructed buildings and held themselves out as owners, refusing to recognize
others as cotenants. Upon trial plaintiff was granted a directed verdict and defendants appealed. HELD: Affirmed.
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The evidence was insufficient to refute the general rule that
each tenant in common, with his cotenant, has the right of
possession of the premises and the possession of one tenant
is the possession of all, thus plaintiff was entitled to partition.
Home v. Cox, 237 S. C. 41, 115 S. E. 2d 513 (1960).
Adverse possession has been defined as an actual, visible and
exclusive appropriation of real estate under claim of right.
Goldman v. Quadrate, 142 Conn. 398, 114 A. 2d 687 (1955) ;
Lewis v. Pope, 86 S. C. 285, 68 S. E. 680 (1909). Tenancy in
common is the holding of property by several distinct titles
with unity of possession, each tenant being seized of an individual part of the whole estate and each being entitled to
the possession of every part. Deal v. State, 14 Ga. App. 121,
80 S. E. 537 (1914); 4 THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY § 1831
(2d Ed. 1939). The presumption is that the possession of
one cotenant is the possession of all, and this becomes adverse
only upon some unequivocal act clearly showing the claim of
exclusive possession in himself and repudiation and ouster of
the others. Rhodes v. Black, 170 S. C. 193, 170 S. E. 158
(1932); Weston v. Morgan, 162 S. C. 177, 160 S. E. 436
(1928). Acts relied upon to establish ouster must be of an
unequivocal nature and so distinctly hostile to the rights of
the other cotenants that the intention to disseize is clear and
unmistakable. Terwilliger v. White, 222 S. C. 176, 72 S. E.
2d 169 (1952) ; Wells vu Coursey, 197 S. C. 483, 15 S. E. 2d 752
(1941). Although unity of possession may be destroyed by
actual ouster of a tenant in common, the ouster will not be
presumed;- it must be proved. Odom v. Weathersbee, 26 S. C.
244, 1 S. E. 890 (1885) ; Allen v. Hall, 1 McCord L. 131 (S. C.
1821). To constitute ouster, it is not necessary that there
should be an actual turning out or forcible ejectment. Jefcoat v. Knotts, 13 Rich. L. 50 (S. C. 1860) ; Gray v. Givens,
2 Hill Equity 511 (S. C. 1836). It has been held that the
cutting of timber and payment of taxes are not such acts
as will amount to adverse possession. MeBeth v. Donnelly,
1 Dud. L. 177 (S. C. 1838). Similarly, continuous possession
for a period of twenty years with an appropriation of rents
and profits creates only a rebuttable presumption of ouster.
Whitaker v. Jeffcoat, 128 S. C. 404, 122 S. E. 495 (1922);
Metz v. Metz, 48 S. C. 472, 26 S. E. 787 (1896). Where the
acts relied upon for claim of adverse possession are public
and notorious and of such character as to leave no doubt that
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the exclusive right of enjoyment is assAiled by tlie holder,
they are deemed sufficient notice of ouster to the tenants in
common, Weston v. Morgan, supra; Miller v. Cramer, 48 S. .
282, 26 S. E. 657 (1896). The courts have concluded that the
open, notorious, continuous, hostile and exclusive possession
for a period of twenty years gives rise to the presumption of
ouster; however, title through ten years adverse possession
requires actual ouster, of which cotenants have or should
have actual knowledge. Watson v. Little, 224 S. C. 359, 79
S. E. 2d 384 (1953) ; Bevard v. Fortune,221 S. C. 117, 69 S. E.
2d 355 (1952).
The fact that possession of one cotenant is deemed the possession of all makes it obvious that clearer and more conclusive
evidence is required in proof of adverse possession between
them than would be required between strangers. While on the
surface the principal case appears to furnish all the necessary
requirements, yet the evidence showed that the defendants
did recognize others as cotenants because they purchased their
interest in the property. Thus the acts relied upon by the
defendants to establish their claim of adverse possession were
not of such a clear and unequivocal nature as would indicate
ouster of plaintiff. As to exclusive possession and the doing
of certain other acts in conjunction with the land, only in rare
cases will an ouster be implied. Wells v. Coursey, supra; Whitaker v. Jeffcoat, supra. The instant case is in agreement with
the fundamental principles and requirements as recognized by
the courts as to adverse possession by tenants in common. The
rules are strict in cases of this nature and rightfully so due
to the peculiar relationship here involved.
FRANcIs W. SHEALY.

TAXATION - Alimony - Payments for Support of
Wife and Children Pursuant to Divorce Decree Deductible
by Husband If No Specific Amount Allocated for Children.
- In anticipation of divorce husband and wife entered an
agreement which provided that the wife would have custody
of their three minor children and that the husband would
pay specified amounts annually to support and maintain the
wife and children. Payments would end on the death of either
the wife or the husband, or upon the wife's remarriage. If
any of the children should become emancipated, marry, or die,
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the payments would be decreased by one-sixth. This agreement
wis subsequently incorporated into the divorce decree.. For
the years 1951-52 the husband deducted all payments to his
wife as alimony on his income tax returns. The Commissioner
determined a deficiency and held that he was entitled to
deduct only one-half of the payments as alimony because the
agreement showed the wife was to keep half of the payments
for her own use and to devote the other half to the support of
the children. Reading the agreement as a whole the Tax Court
found it was reasonable inference that at least one-sixth of
each payment was intended to discharge husband's obligation
to support his children during their minority. Jerry Lester,
32 T. C. 1156 (1961). On appeal, HELD: Reversed. Provisions for reduction of payments upon the happening of some
future event is not the equivalent of fixing a precise amount
which the wife must expend on support of the children. Lester
v. Commissioner,279 F. 2d 354 (2d Cir. 1960).
The Internal Revenue Code of 1939 for the first time allowed a taxpayer to deduct from his gross income alimony
or separate maintenance to his divorced or separated wife.
Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 23 (u), as amended, 56 Stat. 817
(1942) (now Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 215(a)). These periodic payments were made taxable to the wife, excluding any
portion of the payments fixed by decree or agreement for
support of minor children. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 22 (k),
as amended, 56 Stat. 816 (1942) (now Int. Rev. Code of
1954, §§ 71(a) and 71(b)). To determine whether a sum is
fixed for the support of children it is necessary to construe
the agreement as a whole. Robert W. Budd, 7 T. C. 413 (1946),
aLff'd, 177 F. 2d 198 (6th Cir. 1947). Where the agreement
makes no distinction between what is for the wife's support
and what is intended for the children's support, the entire
amount paid by the husband must be treated as income to the
wife. HenriettaS. Seltzer, 22 T. C. 203 (1954) ; Dora H. Moitoret, 7 T. C. 640 (1946). How the money is actually spent by
the wife is of no importance in making this determination.
Truman W. Morsman, 27 T. C. 520 (1956) ; DoraH. Moitoret,
7 T. C. 640 (1946). Many cases have arisen under the statute,
however, which involve agreements that provide for reduction
or elimination of payments contingent upon the wife's remarriage, or upon the marriage, emancipation, or death of
one or more of the children. Leon Mandel, 8 CCH Tax Ct.
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Mem. 445 (1949), aff'd 185 F. 2d 50 (7th Cir. 1950); Mark
B. Deitsch, 26 T. C. 751 (1956), rev'd, 249 F. 2d 534 (6th Cir.
1957). To decide these cases the Tax Court of the United
States has developed the following test: if the agreement
provides for a division or reduction in the total payment upon
the happening of some future event, the provision is a designation of what part of the whole sum is to be used to support
the children and is applicable to all payments; although the
event may never happen, its mention is sufficient to allocate
a definite sum for the children's support; and when this
test is applied, the husband may deduct only the wife's portion
of the whole amount just as though the event had actually
taken place. Estate of Dorothy R. Hirshon, Jean M. Hirshon,
27 T. C. 558 (1956), rev'd, 250 F. 2d 497 (2d Cir. 1957);
Charles S. Weil, Beulah Weil, 22 T. C. 612 (1954), supplemental opinion, 23 T. C. 630 (1955), rev'd, 240 F. 2d 584 (2d
Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 353 U. S. 958 (1957) ; Warren Leslie,
Jr., 10 T. C. 807 (1948). There is a widening difference of
interpretation between the Tax Court and the Courts of Appeals, and among the circuits themselves there is an increasingly sharp division. The Seventh Circuit has adopted the
rationale of the Tax Court, pointing out that while the statute
is remedial and must be construed liberally, there is no reason
to conclude the statutes should be construed liberally in the
husband's favor as against the wife. Mandel v. Commissioner,
185 F 2d 50 (7th Cir. 1950). The Ninth Circuit upholds the
Tax Court, although this circuit mitigates the rule somewhat
by saying that when the agreement read as a whole indicates
a division of payments as between the wife and children, without reference to contingencies which may never come into
being, then part of the amount has been fixed and is payable
only for support of children. Eisinger v. Commissioner, 250
F. 2d 303 (9th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U. S. 913 (1958),
The First Circuit, using Ninth Circuit logic, also reaches the
same conclusion as the Tax Court, and, while it doesn't reject
it, it does announce a distrust of the "broad language" of
the Second Circuit. Metcalf v. Commissioner, 271 F. 2d 288
(1st Cir. 1959). On the other side of the controversy, the
Second Circuit has developed and applied the rule that unless
the agreement specifically designates a named sum for the
support of children, then the entire amount is to be charged
to the wife as alimony; the agreement must require the wife

Published by Scholar Commons, 1960

11

1961]

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 2 [1960], Art. 7
CASE NOTES

to devote these sums exclusively to the children's support, and
she must have no independent beneficial interest in such sums
or expenditure. Weit v. Commissioner,240 F. 2d 584 (2d Cir.
1957), cert. denied, 353 U. S. 958 (1957); Hirshon v. Commissioner, 250 F. 2d 497 (2d Cir. 1957). Accord, Deitsch v.
Commissioner, 249 F. 2d 534 (6th Cir. 1957). In following
the rule that to fix, in the statutory sense, is to assign precisely, the court in the principal case reasons that just because
payments are to be reduced in the event of some contingency
does not mean "from the outset that child's support has
been 'fixed' by the amount of the possible reduction"; the purpose of such agreements is to give the wife discretion in spending the entire payment in the best interest of both the children
and herself and that any other construction would defeat the
purpose of the agreement and the statutes. Lester v. Commissioner, 279 F. 2d 354 (2d Cir. 1960).
What confronts the courts in this area is a fuzzily worded
statute susceptible of various constructions. When this problem arises, the construction to be favored is the one which
most nearly accomplishes the legislative purpose as it establishes a clear rule. The opposing rules of the Tax Court and
of the Second Circuit have the requisite clarity and ease of
application, while those adhered to by the First, Seventh, and
Ninth Circuits are not so clear or definite. However, the
construction the Tax Court has developed would seem, as
Judge Hand points out, to rob the wife of discretion in spending what money she receives to support herself and her
children. As long as the courts continue to rule diversely in
these situations, the lawyer specializing in domestic relations
must take care to draft maintenance agreements according to
the law as propounded in his circuit. To do less could involve
his client in costly tax proceedings in the future.
PETE MARTIN.
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